Buy My Vote: Online Reviews for Sale by Short, Kendall L.
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law 
Volume 15 
Issue 2 Issue 2 - Winter 2013 Article 6 
2013 
Buy My Vote: Online Reviews for Sale 
Kendall L. Short 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Internet Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Kendall L. Short, Buy My Vote: Online Reviews for Sale, 15 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and 
Technology Law 441 (2020) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/jetlaw/vol15/iss2/6 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment & Technology Law by an authorized editor of 
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
Buy My Vote: Online Reviews for Sale
ABSTRACT
The Internet has granted consumers access to a wealth of
information to use in researching products and services. A substantial
portion of this information consists of online consumer eviews, which
hold great influence over consumers' purchasing decisions due to their
perceived honesty and independence from the company. The problem
with relying on these reviews, however, is that real consumers may not
be the authors; instead, companies often hire writers to fabricate
reviews, known as "opinion spam," which can either be positive for the
hiring company or negative toward an innocent competitor. Because
these fake reviews are difficult to detect, both consumers and competing
businesses uffer harm. Parties looking to sue for this harm must
overcome the writers' First Amendment-protected anonymity, making it
a challenge to bring private actions for defamation or complaints to the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Moreover, while the FTC has the
authority to pursue its own claims against the writers and the hiring
companies under its revised guidelines, it has failed to pursue many
cases, in part because of the struggle to identify the perpetrators. And
those groups with the most power to block such reviews from the
Internet-the hosting websites-are immune from suit under the
Federal Communications Decency Act (FCDA). This Note advocates
for greater involvement by the FTC, urges Congress to amend the
FCDA to eliminate website immunity, and encourages the websites to
establish greater measures to bar suspicious reviews and gather more
information to assist in identifying the purveyors of opinion spam.
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There is no doubt that the Internet has made shopping for most
products and services faster and more convenient than going to a store
in person.' The Internet provides consumers with a vast amount of
product information, enabling them to conduct more research before
purchasing, which in theory leads them to better-quality products and
more satisfactory services for their needs.2 This product information
can come from a company's website or through other forms of direct
advertising, but it may also come from allegedly more independent
and reliable sources-online reviews.3
Online reviews are ubiquitous. Professional research groups,
like Consumer Reports, conduct studies to compare products and
provide reviews.4 Retailers, including Amazon and traditional box
stores,5 provide customer feedback for products on their websites.6
And many independent websites, like Yelp and TripAdvisor, solicit
1. See Shoppers Would Rather Research Products Online: Study, PROGRESSIVE GROCER
(May 17, 2010), http://www.progressivegrocer.com/top-stories/special-features/technology/id
31025/shoppers-would-rather-research-products-online-study; seealso Lynn Pregont, 2010 Social
Shopping Study Reveals Changes in Consumers' Online Shopping Habits and Usage of Customer
Reviews, THE E-TAILING GROUP (May 3, 2010, 9:21 AM), http://www.e-tailing.com/
content/?p=1193.
2. See Shoppers Would Rather Research Products Online: Study, supra note 1.
3. See Jacques Bughin et al., A New Way to Measure Word-of-Mouth Marketing,
McKINSEY Q., Apr. 2010, at 6, available at https://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/A-new-way-to-
measure-word-of-mouth marketing_2567.
4. See How We Test, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/
how-we-test/index.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).
5. A "box store" is a physical retail store where a consumer can shop in person (but
which may also have an associated website), which contrasts with online-only stores, such as
Amazon.
6. See Managing Reviews, AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html/ref=hp 16465201_reviews?nodeld=16465311 (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).
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consumer reviews of local businesses.] The growing popularity of
these latter two categories-both based on the customer's opinion of
products and services-has proven to be highly influential. Such
reviews can make or break both new and established companies.8
This influence comes from the fact that new customers, who
are researching products or services they might buy, are more likely to
trust other customers' reviews (based on actual experience) over their
own evaluations of the seller's direct advertising.9 In fact, studies
show consumers trust these personal customer reviews second only to
recommendations from family and friends.'0
The problem with relying on consumer reviews is that real
consumers are often not the authors; instead, the company has paid
someone to fabricate reviews." These reviews, known as "opinion
spam,"12 either positively review the company's own product to
increase its customer base, or negatively review a competitor's product
to deter potential customers.13  The people writing the reviews,
however, have never used the product; thus, their comments can be
inaccurate and misleading.14
Opinion spam is problematic because unsuspecting consumers
trust the fabricated reviews when making decisions about how to
spend their money.15 Some consumers claim to be able to spot fake
reviews and have published tips on how to identify them.16 But many
7. See About TripAdvisor, TRIPADVISOR, www.tripadvisor.com/pages/about_us.html
(last visited Sept. 15, 2012); About Us, YELP, www.yelp.com/about (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).
8. See Shahana Sen & Dawn Lerman, Why Are You Telling Me This? An Examination
into Negative Consumer Reviews on the Web, 21 J. INTERACTIVE MKTG. 76, 77, 90 (2007).
9. Suzanne McFadden, Everyone's a Critic Online-Perils and Promise for Business,
N.Z. HERALD (June 10, 2011), http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c-id=3&
objectid=10731334; see Bughin et al., supra note 3, at 2.
10. Abid Rahman, Who Reviews Reviews?, S. CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 30, 2011,
12:00 AM), http://www.scmp.com/article/980500/who-reviews-reviews; ee Pregont, supra note 1.
11. See Jason Cochran, Earn Extra Money by Writing Fake Positive Reviews on
Amazon.com!, DAILYFINANCE (Jan. 21, 2009, 1:00 PM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2009/01/21/
earn-extra-money-by-writing-fake-positive-reviews-on-amazon-com; David Meyer, Fake Reviews
Prompt Belkin Apology, ZDNET (Jan. 20, 2009, 5:35 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/news/fake-
reviews-prompt-belkin-apology/262932.
12. Myle Ott et al., Finding Deceptive Opinion Spam by Any Stretch of the Imagination,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 49TH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTATIONAL
LINGUISTICS 309, 309 (2011), available at http://aclweb.org/anthology/P/P11/P11-1032.pdf.
13. See David Streitfeld, In a Race to Out-Rave, 5-Star Web Reviews Go for $5, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/technology/finding-fake-reviews-
online.html.
14. See Meyer, supra note 11.
15. See id.
16. See Jason Cochran, Fruity and Ostentatious, Yet Highly Fictitious: Online
Restaurant, Hotel Reviews Easy to Fake, DAILYFINANCE (Aug. 21, 2008, 4:00 PM), http://www.
dailyfinance.com/2008/08/21/fruity-and-ostentatious-yet-highly-fictitious-online-restauran.
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reviews still slip through the cracks and go unidentified, even by
people aware of possible deception.17 These unidentified fake reviews
then go on to achieve their purpose of increasing the sponsoring
company's business or harming the competition. 18
The review "feedback loop" exacerbates the problem.19 The
feedback loop is the phenomenon in which people are more likely to
select businesses or products that have many positive reviews and
avoid those that have neutral or negative reviews, or even those that
only have a few positive reviews.20 The companies or products that
have more positive reviews garner more real customers, who then post
real reviews, thereby drawing in even more customers.21 Therefore, it
benefits companies to pay for initial reviews-either very good reviews
for themselves or very bad reviews for their competitors. Those
companies that act ethically, however, and refrain from participating
in this practice, suffer. They either become the target of a malicious
campaign of negative reviews, which can drive away customers from
even established businesses, or they lack enough exposure to receive
legitimate positive reviews from a feedback loop. 2 2
Currently, the law does not adequately address the growing
problem of opinion spam. Those getting paid to write the reviews can
maintain anonymity by claiming First Amendment free-speech
protection.23 The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) grants the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) the authority to prevent the use of
"unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."24 Thus far,
however, the FTC has pursued only the most egregious abusers.25
Moreover, the FTCA conflicts with the Federal Communications
Decency Act (FCDA), which grants websites immunity from what
others post.2 6 Finally, the Lanham Act (the federal trademark act)
provides some protection for the target companies through liability,
but it is effective only for violations of the companies' trademark
rights, which do not often occur in opinion spam.27
17. See Ott et al., supra note 12, at 310; see also Streitfeld, supra note 13.





23. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
25. See, e.g., Jayne O'Donnell, Watch Out for Fake Online Reviews and Review Sites,
USA TODAY (Nov. 4, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/story/2011-
11-01/deceptive-product-review-sites/51033028/1.
26. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A).
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This Note examines the problem of opinion spam. Part I
explores the history and prevalence of opinion spam and the governing
laws. Part II analyzes the various legal doctrines these paid-for
reviews implicate and the potential rights of the writers. Part III
advocates for a three-pronged solution: (1) increasing FTC claims and
penalties against firms that pay for reviews, (2) amending the FCDA
to eliminate immunity for the hosting websites, and (3) encouraging
market-based cooperative efforts by the website hosts to identify and
block fake reviewers. Part IV concludes by encouraging private actors
and regulatory agencies to work together to tackle this pervasive
problem.
I. DISCOVERING OPINION SPAM
Online reviews continue to grow in number and importance
among consumers.28 But fake reviews, otherwise known as opinion
spam, taint the pool of reviews and make the honest reviews less
credible.29 This abuse of the review system is detrimental for both
duped consumers3 0 and businesses targeted by competitors.31
A. Prevalence of Consumer Reviews
The ability to research and make purchases online has
continued to grow and supplant in-store customer benefits, such as
consultation with sales staff and physical examination of a product.32
PowerReviews' and the e-tailing group's "2010 Social Shopping Study"
found that consumers preferred online research to in-store research
for three main reasons: (1) it takes less time (according to 79 percent
of participants), (2) it makes consumers feel more confident in their
purchase decisions (83 percent), and (3) it provides credible
information (82 percent).33  Lauren Freedman, president of the
e-tailing group, noted: "Whereas once online product research was left
to the technology savvy looking to make a major purchase, it is now
part of the mainstream shopping experience for all product categories
28. See discussion infra Part I.A.
29. See discussion infra Part I.B.
30. See discussion infra Part I.C.1.
31. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
32. See Shoppers Would Rather Research Products Online: Study, supra note 1
(conducting a survey of over one thousand consumers who shop at least four times annually and
spend $250 or more each year through online shopping); see also Pregont, supra note 1.
33. Pregont, supra note 1.
2013] 445
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as consumers have taken control powering their own product
research."34
Online review websites have quickly become both popular and
powerful. For example, Yelp, which provides consumer reviews of
local businesses, found that its traffic quadrupled in 2008.35 In just
the month of October 2008, it had five million unique visitors.36 Only
four years later, in the second quarter of 2012, the website averaged
78 million visitors monthly, and contained more than 30 million
reviews.37 The company-which is privately held-does not post its
earnings, but it does not make money from the reviews; it makes
money only from selling ad space to local businesses.38 Its primary
model is more "labor-intensive" than other ad-based companies, as it
requires an old-fashioned sales force, which can be expensive.39 This
method of ad generation has allegedly led the company to also seek
other ways of increasing its ad revenue by taking advantage of the
opinion spam problem; some listed businesses have complained that
Yelp has refused to remove suspicious negative reviews from its
website unless the businesses agree to pay for advertising.40
Another website, TripAdvisor, which offers consumer reviews
of travel-related businesses, including hotels and restaurants, also
enjoys wide popularity.41 It boasts more than 60 million unique
visitors monthly with over 75 million reviews and opinions.42 This
publicly-traded company claimed $486 million in revenue in 2010.43
Therefore, these review websites not only serve an altruistic motive to
assist consumer shopping; they also represent a profitable industry
with growing financial clout.4 4
Online consumer reviews have increased not only in prevalence
but also in perceived importance.45 A recent survey found that 76
34. Id.
35. Dan Fost, The Coffee Was Lousy. The Wait Was Long., N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/21/business/smallbusiness/21yelp.html.
36. Id.
37. About Us, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/about (last visited Sept. 15, 2012).
38. See id.
39. Fost, supra note 35.
40. See id.
41. See About TripAdvisor, supra note 7.
42. Id.
43. The Boston Globe, TRIPADVISOR, http://www.tripadvisor.com/PressCenter-i494
9 -c2 -
Press Coverage.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2012).
44. See About TripAdvisor, supra note 7.
45. See RatePoint Survey Reveals New Customers Form Their First Impression From





percent of consumers read online customer reviews before trying an
unfamiliar company.46 For services that visit a person's home, that
number rose to 81 percent.47 Thus, in general, customers rely heavily
on online reviews.48
B. How Companies Create Opinion Spam
A company creates opinion spam by paying third parties for
reviews of products or services in an effort to increase the company's
customer base while reducing the customer base of the company's
competitors.49 Opinion spam takes two forms: either positive reviews
for the company's own product or service, or negative reviews of a
competitor's product or service.50 The former aims to increase the
company's customer base, while the latter aims to drive customers
away from a competitor-and toward the sponsoring company.51
Companies hire small workforces of individuals to write these
reviews, rather than hiring a separate company to do the work.52 For
example, in 2009, a blogger accused Belkin, a networking and
peripheral manufacturer that sells its products on Amazon, of
soliciting reviews through Amazon's Mechanical Turk workforce.5 1
The Mechanical Turk website allows individuals to hire themselves
out for small tasks that computers cannot do.5 4 Belkin claimed that a
single employee was responsible for soliciting the reviews and that it
was "an isolated incident."55 The employee allegedly asked "turkers"
to write positive reviews of Belkin products at the rate of 65 cents per
review.56 It appears that there were no legal ramifications from the




48. See id. ("The RatePoint study also revealed consumers now use online reviews (68
percent) nearly as much as recommendations from friends (77 percent) before trying a new
business."); see also Global Advertising: Consumers Trust Real Friends and Virtual Strangers the
Most, NIELSENWIRE (July 7, 2009), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/consumer/global-
advertising-consumers-trust-real-friends-and-virtual-strangers-the-most; Online Shopping Hong
Kong Consumers, BUS. TRENDS ASIA E-MAGAZINE (Sept. 15, 2010), http://www.businesstrends
asia.com/index.php?cat=213:214:215&art=3105.
49. See O'Donnell, supra note 25.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Meyer, supra note 11.
53. Id.
54. Amazon Mechanical Turk, AMAZON.COM, www.mturk.com (last visited Sept. 15,
2012).
55. Meyer, supra note 11.
56. Id.
2013] 447
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incident; it was not until later in 2009 that the FTC promulgated its
updated guidelines that enable it to take action against such
reviews.57
The blogger found the ad on the Mechanical Turk website while
looking for small jobs to do himself.5 8 An investigative journalist for
the New York Times found additional ads either soliciting review
writers or offering such services on websites including Fiverr, Digital
Point, and Craigslist.59 These uncovered incidents show how such
solicitations for opinion-spam writers may be hiding in plain sight.
Unless someone happens to spot such an ad and brings it to light,
these companies can easily continue to use such websites to find
writers to create opinion spam.
C. Why Opinion Spam Is Harmful
Opinion spam harms both consumers and businesses.60
Consumers rely on the independence of online reviews to make
purchasing decisions, but they are often unaware that many reviews
are fake.61 Those who are aware still have a difficult time sorting the
real from the fabricated.62 Businesses suffer because they are the
subjects of targeted attacks by competitors who hire writers to post
negative reviews of their products.63 Further, they lose business when
their competitors engage in unethical practices and dishonestly
promote their own products.64
1. Harm to Consumers
Many consumers are unaware that opinion spam exists.65 As
noted by journalist Abid Rahman, "Consumers are only just becoming
aware of the 'sock puppet' phenomenon, where businesses and
individuals assume an online identity which appears as a normal and
independent consumer, and then seek to praise their own products or
57. See Press Release, FTC, FTC Publishes Final Guides Governing Endorsements,
Testimonials (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/10/endortest.shtm.
58. Meyer, supra note 11.
59. Streitfeld, supra note 13.
60. See discussion infra Part I.C.1-2.
61. See discussion infra Part I.C.1.
62. See discussion infra Part I.C..
63. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.
64. See discussion infra Part I.C.2.





business."66 Some consumers, however, have grown leery of online
reviews.67 The "2010 Social Shopping Study" found the top factors
reducing trust were: not enough reviews, doubt that real customers
wrote the reviews, and limited or no availability of negative reviews.8
Some critics have advanced tips for consumers to use in trying to
discern fake reviews.69  Recommendations include reading many
reviews for a product and then eliminating the "most glowing and
most angry postings," or ones that appear to have been written by a
public relations person of the company because they are too detailed or
ecstatic.70 Others advise consumers to look for detailed descriptions of
the location as evidence the reviewer has actually visited the hotel,
restaurant, or similar service, and to avoid reviews that include
information extraneous to the review, such as whether the person
supposedly traveled to a place on business, as evidence of a fake
review.71
Despite consumers' increased awareness and the development
of these tips, however, consumers still cannot easily identify fabricated
reviews for myriad reasons.72  First, consumers suffer from
"truth bias," meaning they are more likely to classify an opinion as
truthful than deceptive.73 Second, while computers can distinguish
between truthful and fabricated reviews by running algorithms that
analyze multiple technical factors of the review, 74 the average
consumer does not have access to these special algorithms. Third, the
tips promulgated for identifying fabricated reviews are based on
heuristics and are therefore unreliable.75  Finally, even when
consumers study the most reliable tips, companies that create online
spam can study those same tips.76 Those trying to game the system
66. Rahman, supra note 10.
67. Shoppers Would Rather Research Products Online: Study, supra note 1.
68. Id.
69. See Cochran, supra note 16.
70. Id.
71. See Fisman, supra note 65.
72. See Ott et al., supra note 12, at 313, 316-17.
73. Id. at 313. Scholars dispute why people are more likely to believe a statement is
true rather than false with such hypotheses as (a) it is a default to believe incoming information
is truthful until additional evidence indicates otherwise, and (b) people usually tell the truth
themselves and therefore are more likely to believe others also tell the truth. See Timothy R.
Levine et al., Accuracy in Detecting Truths and Lies: Documenting the "Veracity Effect", 66
COMM. MONOGRAPHS 125, 140-41 (1999).
74. See Ott et al., supra note 12, at 316-17 (combining a psycholinguistic approach with
a standard text categorization approach to look for lack of sensorial and concrete language, lack
of specificity about spatial configurations, increased focus on aspects external to the business,
higher rate of positive emotion terms, and increased first person singular sentence structures).
75. See generally Cochran, supra note 16.
76. See Fisman, supra note 65.
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are likely to use the recommendations for spotting fake reviews to
hone their strategy and make their reviews harder to detect.77 All of
these issues work against consumers' ability to identify opinion spam
with any consistency.78
Without the ability to adequately distinguish truthful from
fake reviews, consumers will unwittingly continue to rely on
misleading and dishonest reviews when deciding what products to
purchase online.79
2. Harm to Businesses
Businesses also suffer from opinion spam.80 Even established
businesses with many positive reviews can suffer from a few fake
negative reviews because consumers give more credence to negative
information, particularly when evaluating utilitarian products such as
dishwashers and other durable consumer goods.81 Consumers view
the negative information as more salient and accurate, even when
surrounded by positive reviews.82 Thus, a competitor's investment in
even a few negative reviews can have a substantial impact on a
company's customer base.83
For example, the Rees Hotel in Queenstown, Australia,
discovered that commenters had inadvertently linked several negative
reviews to its page rather than with the real subject of the
unflattering commentary, a hotel in west Texas.84 The mistake cost
the hotel profits from an estimated forty room rentals per month for
two years.85  Fortunately, the hotel's chief executive spotted the
reviews and remedied the problem. The publicity has since attracted
even more customers to the Rees.86 But other companies that either
77. Id.
78. See Ott et al., supra note 12, at 313, 316-17.
79. Id.
80. See Sen & Lerman, supra note 8, at 77.
81. Id. at 77, 91. There appears to be no negativity bias when consumers research
entertainment products in which choices are based more on subjective taste than actual
usefulness, such as movies, music, and art. Id. at 79, 91; cf. Wenjing Duan et al., Do Online
Reviews Matter?-An Empirical Investigation of Panel Data, 45 DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
1007 (2008), available at home.gwu.edu/-wduan/Paper/DSS112008.pdf (examining impact of
online reviews and word-of-mouth advertising on the film industry and finding that online
reviews may have little persuasive impact but may have the effect of increasing awareness of
popular films).
82. Sen & Lerman, supra note 8, at 90.
83. Id.





do not notice negative reviews, or are unable to remove them, are not
so fortunate.87
When a company spots a negative review, it has three
options.88  First, the company can reach out to the disgruntled
customer and offer to remedy the problem, prompting the customer to
amend or remove his online complaint.89 This method-excellent
customer service-is very effective.90 Indeed, Keith Cooper, CEO of
RatePoint, Inc. stated, "Sometimes a negative review can turn off a
customer, but our consumer behavior study shows a public response
from the business can win back a customer who might have otherwise
taken their business elsewhere."91 The study found that 40 percent of
people would consider using a local business that responds to a
negative online review.92 Unlike real reviews, however, fake reviews
provide no opportunity for business owners to respond and address
problems raised by disgruntled customers, especially when reviewers
post anonymously.93
A second method for target companies to mitigate negative
reviews is to hire a firm that manages businesses' online
reputations.94 This arrangement also financially disadvantages target
companies.95 Smaller companies, in particular, suffer because they do
not have the resources to investigate false reviews or to pay
reputation-management firms.96 In addition, there is no guarantee
that these reputation-management firms can get the false review
87. See, e.g., Reit v. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 415 (Sup. Ct. 2010) (rejecting
plaintiffs claim that Yelp refused to remove negative reviews unless he paid for advertising).
88. See Streitfeld, supra note 13 (illustrating how companies can reach out to
disgruntled customers or hire a firm that manages small businesses' reputations); see also Fost,
supra note 35 (illustrating how companies can, albeit often unsuccessfully, ask websites to take
down certain reviews).
89. See Streitfeld, supra note 13 (explaining how a courteous response to a negative
review could prompt a customer to turn his negative review into a much more positive one).
90. Id.
91. RatePoint Survey Reveals 70 Percent of Consumers Appreciate Being Asked to Write




93. See Christopher Elliott, Should You Try to Keep Negative Customer Reviews Off the
Internet?, CBS MONEY WATCH (Apr. 18, 2011, 9:07 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-
505125_162-40144055/should-you-try-to-keep-negative-customer-reviews-off-the-internet
(illustrating the effectiveness and benefits of a business quickly addressing a genuine problem
from a known customer).
94. See Streitfeld, supra note 13; see also Angus Loten, Hoping to Fix Bad Reviews? Not
So Fast, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI000087239639044484010
4577548982072928526.html.
95. See, e.g., Loten, supra note 94.
96. Id.
2013] 451
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
removed from the hosting website.97 Rather, they help the target
company encourage real customers to post positive reviews to dilute
the impact of the negative ones.98 Some have taken on the role of
watchdog for their clients, like the company KwikChex.com, which
complained to the British Advertising Standards Authority (ASA)
about reviews on TripAdvisor.99 As a result of its investigation, the
ASA ultimately forced TripAdvisor to remove its slogan "Reviews you
can trust" from its website.00
Third, a business can inform the hosting website that it
believes the negative reviews are online spam and request that the
website remove them. This tactic is often unsuccessful, because the
website might be unwilling to remove what it believes is a legitimate
negative review.101 In other instances, the website might try to exploit
the business owner suffering from a negative review, even if it
suspects the review is fake.102 For example, several business owners
have claimed that Yelp refuses to take down negative comments
unless the business pays for ads on the website, and sometimes Yelp
outright rejects requests.103 Without the cooperation of the hosting
website, therefore, it can be very difficult for companies to remove
negative reviews.
The hosting websites should reconsider the long-term
consequences and eschew opinion spam, lest they suffer their own
harm from a tarnished reputation as a source for reliable reviews.104
Several websites have provisions in their terms of service that prohibit
their users from posting fake reviews,105 yet it is unclear how many of
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Mark Sweney, TripAdvisor Faces ASA Investigation After Review Complaints,
GUARDIAN (Sept. 2, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/20I1/sep/02/tripadvisor-asa-
investigation-reviews.
100. Rosie Baker, Retailers Join Forces to Rebuild Trust in Online Reviews,
MARKETINGWEEK (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.marketingweek.co.uk/disciplines/digital/retailers-
join-forces-to-rebuild-trust-in-online-reviews/3030472.article.
101. See Rahman, supra note 10.
102. See Fost, supra note 35.
103. Id.
104. See Sony, Currys, PC World, Dixons.co.uk, Everything Everywhere, Best Buy UK,
Jessops and Others Back New Reevoo Manifesto to Renew Trust in Consumer Reviews, BUS. WIRE
(Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.businesswire.comlnews/home/20110927005358/en/Sony-Currys-PC-
World-Dixons.co.uk-Buy-UK.
105. See, e.g., Terms of Service, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/static? country-US&p-tos
(last visited Sept. 15, 2012) (prohibiting users from "writing a fake or defamatory review, trading
reviews with other businesses, or compensating someone or being compensated to write or
remove a review"); TripAdvisor Website Terms, Conditions and Notices, TRIPADVISOR,
http://www.tripadvisor.com/pages/terms.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2012) (prohibiting users from
posting content "that impersonates any person or entity or otherwise misrepresents your
affiliation with a person or entity").
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them actually enforce these provisions. It is also uncertain how
successful these efforts will be due to the difficulty in distinguishing
real reviews from fake ones.106 Unless they cooperate with efforts to
eliminate opinion spam, the hosting websites themselves could suffer
from consumer distrust as the public becomes increasingly aware of
the opinion spam problem.
On the other side of the equation, companies that pay for
positive reviews of their own products or services ride the wave of a
positive feedback loop. 107 The more positive reviews a company
garners, the more sales it is likely to enjoy, which then leads to a
greater number of reviews from legitimate consumers, drawing yet
more sales.108 A recent study of restaurants found that an extra star
on Yelp is worth approximately 5 to 9 percent in revenue.109 Only
when someone discovers that the company has been paying for
positive reviews does the sponsoring company face any backlash.110
That backlash can be lethal, as seen by the downfall of Ferrit, an
online-shopping company run by Telecom in New Zealand.111 Ferrit
posted seven positive reviews for one of its products, a $500 toaster,
which it then admitted had been written in-house as part of its
advertising campaign.112 Telecom later shut down Ferrit for becoming
unprofitable.11 3
The line dividing acceptable and unacceptable behavior has
become blurred, sowing uncertainty for companies trying to remain
truthful. For example, an English hotel, The Cove, solicited "guests to
post an 'honest but positive review' on TripAdvisor" and would in turn
give them 10 percent off the cost of their next visit.114  Other
companies offer free products or copies of books in exchange for a
review." 5 These businesses solicit real users but offer them free
products as compensation, incentivizing the users who enjoyed the
products to write a positive review. This gray area leaves sponsoring
106. See discussion supra Part I.C.1.
107. See Streitfeld, supra note 13.
108. See Rahman, supra note 10.
109. See Fisman, supra note 65 (discussing a study done by Michael Luca of Harvard
Business School).
110. See McFadden, supra note 9.
111. See id.
112. Ana Samways, Ferrit Writes Own Consumer Reviews, SPARE ROOM (Sept. 4, 2006,
11:39 PM), http://www.spareroom.co.nz/2006/09/04/ferrit-writes-own-consumer-reviews.
113. Telecom NZ Closes www.Ferrit.co.nz-New Zealand's Largest Online Shopping
Mall, ECOMMERCE REP., http://www.ecommercereport.com.aulstory64.php (last visited Sept. 21,
2012).
114. Streitfeld, supra note 13.
115. See id.
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companies unclear on what is permissible versus what exposes them
to harm, should they cross the ethical boundary.
D. The Legal Loopholes
Litigants currently challenge opinion spam in only the clearest
and most egregious instances due to the many obstacles they must
overcome.116 The reviews posted online change quickly, and hired
workers can post anonymously or use false information based on the
requirements of the website.117 The writers may also try to claim First
Amendment free-speech protection.11 8 From there, the plaintiff must
investigate to find the hiring company that paid the authors for the
reviews. Only when a party overcomes all of these hurdles will the
FTC be able to step in and take action.119 Additionally, the easily
identifiable parties, the websites themselves, have immunity under
the FCDA, so naming them as defendants can be a waste of a
plaintiffs time and resources.120
1. First Amendment of the US Constitution
If reviewers honestly express their beliefs in their reviews,
then the First Amendment right to freedom of speech protects their
statements against defamation challenges by targeted competitors.121
For example, in a case involving an investment-advisory firm's
negative review of a school district's bond offerings, the US Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit stated: "[a] statement of opinion relating
to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably false
factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection" from
state defamation laws.122 There, the review was too vague to be
116. See discussion supra Parts I.B, I.C.2.
117. See, e.g., Create Your Yelp Profile, YELP, http://www.yelp.com/signup (last visited
Sept. 21, 2012) (requiring only name, email address, password, and zip code to sign up); Sign Up
for TripAdvisor, TRIPADVISOR, www.tripadvisor.com (follow Register Now!) (last visited Sept. 15,
2012) (requiring only name, email address, password, and current city).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
119. See, e.g., Press Release, FTC, Public Relations Firm to Settle FTC Charges that It
Advertised Clients' Gaming Apps through Misleading Online Endorsements (Aug. 26, 2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/08/reverb.shtm [hereinafter Public Relations Firm to Settle FIC
Charges].
120. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
121. See Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d
848, 852 (10th Cir. 1999) (dismissing a school district's claim for an investment-advisory firm's
article evaluating bonds issued by the school district, in part because the opinions expressed in




proven false.123 The First Amendment thus protects authors who
either state the truth or honestly believe their reviews are based on
the truth, even if later proven false.
If, however, a plaintiff can show that the reviewer knowingly
posted false information, then she may pursue a defamation claim
under state libel laws because false claims forfeit First Amendment
protection.124 For example, Georgia requires a libel plaintiff to show
that there was false and malicious defamation of another, expressed in
print, which harms the reputation of the person.125 Under the statute,
"a libel is published as soon as it is communicated to any person other
than the party libeled."126 In general, courts are split on whether a
prospective plaintiff must demand a retraction before filing suit, a
requirement that can pose another hurdle to taking action and bar the
suit before the defendant even needs to assert a First Amendment
defense.127
Even if a defendant does not enjoy First Amendment
protections, the First Amendment can still make it more difficult for a
plaintiff to obtain the true name and identifying information about the
author. In Krinsky v. Doe 6, the president of a corporation sued ten
unnamed defendants for allegedly defamatory statements made on
websites.128 She served a subpoena on the Internet Service Provider
(ISP) to get the identities of the anonymous posters. The court, after
much discussion of the proper requirements, found that the plaintiff
would first have to make a prima facie showing of the elements of her
defamation claims, which she failed to do.129 The court required this
showing both to protect the authors' First Amendment right to post
material anonymously on the Internet and to prevent the plaintiff
123. See Alison Frankel, Angry About Possible U.S. Downgrade? Don't Bother Suing
Raters, THOMSON REUTERS (Aug. 2, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/New-
York/News/2011/08- August/Angry-about-possibleU_S downgradeDonrtbothersuing-
raters.
124. See generally Carolyn Kelly MacWilliam, Annotation, Individual and Corporate
Liability for Libel and Slander in Electronic Communications, Including E-mail, Internet and
Websites, 3 A.L.R.6th 153 § 28 (2005).
125. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-1 (2012).
126. Michael A. Rataj, The Doctrine of Self Publication, 1989 DETROIT C.L. REV. 197, 225
n.20 (citations omitted).
127. Compare Mathis v. Cannon, 573 S.E.2d 376 (Ga. 2002) (requiring a demand for
retraction on an Internet bulletin board of the offending post prior to filing a defamation suit),
with Zelinka v. Americare Healthscan, Inc., 763 So. 2d 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding
that no demand for retraction was necessary when a private individual posted a message on a
computer service owned and operated by a third party).
128. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 234-39 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing
limited free-speech protection of an anonymous Internet poster charged with allegation of
posting defamatory statement).
129. Id. at 244-45.
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from stifling legitimate criticism.130  The plaintiff might have
succeeded had she been able to satisfy the prima facie claim
requirement, as the court noted, "When vigorous criticism descends
into defamation, . . . constitutional protection is no longer
available."131 The First Amendment will thus protect those reviewers
who either actually state the truth or honestly believe they state the
truth. Even if it does not directly protect a dishonest defendant, the
aura of the First Amendment can still hinder a plaintiff by requiring
that the plaintiff demand a retraction before filing suit or demonstrate
the prima facie elements of defamation to break through a defendant's
a shield of anonymity.
2. Federal Trade Commission Act
The Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) grants power to
and directs the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to prevent the use of
"unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."132 The Seventh
Circuit explained that the FTC strongly favors consumers because its
"duty is to protect the casual, one might even say the negligent,
reader, as well as the vigilant and more intelligent and discerning
public" from unfair and deceptive practices.133 Just because an expert
or a computer programmer might claim to be able to identify false
reviews does not mean that the average consumer can,134 and it is the
average reasonable consumer whom the FTC must protect. 135
Consistent with its duty, the FTC has brought claims for false
disparagement of competitors, though not in the opinion spam context.
For example, in the case of E.B. Muller & Company v. FTC, the FTC
succeeded in its disparagement claim against a seller of chicory, a
coffee substitute, because the company admitted that it had falsely
represented the ingredients of a competitor's product.136 The court
held that "[flalse disparagement of the competitor's goods is an unfair
130. Id.
131. Id. at 238; see also Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 256 (D. Conn. 2008)
(finding that similarly situated plaintiff satisfied the prima-facie-elements requirement
sufficient to require ISP to produce identifying information of defamatory posters).
132. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2006).
133. Parker Pen Co. v. FTC, 159 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1946) (requiring company to
make limitations on product guarantee clear to the public in its advertising to avoid deception).
134. See discussion supra Part I.C. 1.
135. See FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that
consumers just need to act "reasonabl[y]" under the circumstances); Parker Pen Co., 159 F.2d at
511.
136. E. B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 516 (6th Cir. 1944).
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method of competition" under the FTCA.13 7 The false disparagement,
however, must originate either from the management or from enough
members of the sales force based on relative size of the company to
constitute an "unfair method of competition." 13  In Philip Carey
Manufacturing Co. v. FTC, the court found that even though a few
members of the sales staff had disparaged a competitor's product by
making the unfounded claim to potential customers that the product
would not work in extreme temperatures, the company had not
authorized such comments and had instead expressly instructed its
employees not to say such things.139 Further, because only a small
handful of the approximately six hundred salesmen made less than a
dozen disparaging statements over the course of several years, the
court determined the quantity of actors and statements was not
enough to constitute a "method" of competition and therefore refused
to hold the entire company liable.140
On the other hand, it might be easier for the FTC to hold
companies liable for hiring writers to post positive reviews about the
companies' own products and services, since these statements fall into
the category of false paid-for testimonials.141 In FTC v. Standard
Education Society, the Supreme Court upheld the FTC's
determination that using fake testimonials touting the benefits of an
encyclopedia service constituted a "false, deceptive and misleading"
practice because consumers might rely on the reviews, believing they
were true.142 The company had used testimonials under the names of
real customers, but the individuals stated they had neither written
nor authorized such testimonials for the encyclopedia. 143
If the reviews contain what reviewers actually believe, courts
are typically more willing to let companies use the reviews to promote
their products and services. For example, in the 1932 case Northam
Warren Corp. v. FTC, the court determined that the use of
testimonials containing true statements was permissible, despite the
fact that the company paid substantial sums of money to obtain the
testimonials and did not disclose the fact of payment in the
advertisements.14 4 The court stated: "It is doubtful if the public is
137. Id. (citing Perma-Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941)).
138. Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 29 F.2d 49, 51 (6th Cir. 1928).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Press Release, FTC, Firm to Pay FTC $250,000 to Settle Charges That It Used
Misleading Online "Consumer" and "Independent" Reviews (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/
opa/2011/03/legacy.shtm [hereinafter Firm to Pay FTC $250,000 to Settle Charges].
142. FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 118 n.2 (1937).
143. Id.
144. Northam Warren Corp. v. FTC, 59 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1932).
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gullible enough to believe that such testimonials are given without
compensation. But, if they are paid for, providing they are truthful,
no one is deceived."45 The court emphasized that the truthfulness of
the information conveyed to the public indicated that no deception
occurred.146
Even if the reviewer honestly expresses opinions touting the
false characteristics of a product, courts will protect the opinions
because people have the right to express their beliefs.147 In Scientific
Manufacturing Co. v. FTC, the Third Circuit refused to enjoin
publishers from distributing pamphlets about the supposed health
risks of using aluminum cooking utensils because they were not
financially involved in the sale of those kinds of products.148 The court
held:
[T]he publication, sale and distribution of matter concerning an article of trade by a
person not engaged or financially interested in commerce in that trade is not an unfair
or deceptive act or practice . . . if the published matter, even though unfounded or
untrue, represents the publisher's honest opinion or belief. 149
The FTC's 2009 revised guidelines on endorsements and
testimonials substantiate the notion that, however untrue, a
reviewer's honest opinions about a product or service are allowed.150
The new guidelines state: "Endorsements must reflect the honest
opinions, findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser."15 1 Further,
the hiring company must disclose a material relationship even with
honest reviewers, reflecting a change since Northam Warren.152 In its
regulations, the FTC provided a set of examples that demand full
disclosure of a material connection.153 Example eight, in particular,
describes an online message board for digital-music enthusiasts to
exchange information about new products.154 An employee of a
music-device manufacturer posts messages promoting the company's
145. Id. at 197.
146. Id. at 198.
147. See Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640, 644 (3d Cir. 1941).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a) (2009).
151. Id. An endorsement is further defined in the guidelines as "any advertising
message . . . that consumers are likely to believe reflects the opinions, beliefs, findings, or
experiences of a party other than the sponsoring advertiser." Id. § 255.0(b).
152. See id. § 255.1(d) ("Advertisers are subject to liability for false or unsubstantiated
statements made through endorsements, or for failing to disclose material connections between
themselves and their endorsers . . . ."); Id. § 255.5 (2009) ("When there exists a connection
between the endorser and the seller of the advertised product that might materially affect the
weight or credibility of the endorsement (i.e., the connection is not reasonably expected by the
audience), such connection must be fully disclosed.").
153. Id. § 255.5.
154. Id.
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product without disclosing her employment connection.1 55  The
example explains that "[k]nowledge of this poster's employment likely
would affect the weight or credibility of her endorsement. Therefore,
the poster should clearly and conspicuously disclose her relationship
to the manufacturer to members and readers of the message board."1 56
The FTC has recently enforced this disclosure requirement in
two opinion spam cases, both of which settled.15 7 In one matter,
various video-game developers had legitimately hired Reverb, a
public-relations and marketing firm, to help market their video-game
applications.158  Reverb often received a percentage of the games'
sales,159 so it instructed its employees to pose as ordinary customers
and post reviews of the video games on the iTunes store, without
disclosing that the developers had hired Reverb for marketing.16 0 It
did not appear that the video-game developers were aware of, or
authorized, Reverb's tactics.16 1 Since Reverb did not disclose the
financial connection, however, the FTC found the reviews to constitute
a deceptive trade practice.162 Under the settlement agreement, Reverb
agreed to remove any deceptive reviews its employees had posted and
refrain from posting any more without the proper disclosure.161
In the second matter, concerning Legacy Learning Systems, the
FTC again brought claims alleging the company paid reviewers to
endorse its product for learning how to play the guitar.164 The reviews
on several different websites contained no disclosure that the
reviewers were actually affiliates of Legacy.165 Legacy settled the case
for $250,000, a comparatively small portion of the approximately $5
million in sales it earned for the instructional products from the false
reviews.166 David Viadeck, the Director of the FTC's Bureau of
Consumer Protection, advised that: "Advertisers using affiliate
marketers to promote their products would be wise to put in place a
reasonable monitoring program to verify that those affiliates follow
the principles of truth in advertising."16 7 As part of the settlement
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See O'Donnell, supra note 25.
158. See Public Relations Firm to Settle FTC Charges, supra note 119.
159. Complaint at 1-2, In re Reverb Commc'ns, Inc., No. C-4310 (F.T.C. Nov. 22, 2010).
160. Public Relations Firm to Settle FTC Charges, supra note 119.
161. See id.; Complaint, supra note 159.
162. See Public Relations Firm to Settle FTC Charges, supra note 119.
163. Id.
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agreement, Legacy agreed to monitor and submit monthly reports
about its top fifty revenue-generating affiliate marketers, in addition
to adding the appropriate disclosures about their financial
connections.168 Thus, the FTC has the proper authority to pursue
those violating its regulations. As discussed in Parts II.B and III.A
below, however, its actions to date have been lackluster, tackling only
the most obvious offenses with minimal consequences.
3. Federal Communications Decency Act
The Federal Communications Decency Act (FCDA) grants
immunity to websites that host the postings that hired reviewers
write.169 The statute contains a provision which reads, "No provider or
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider."170 Yelp invoked this immunity in Reit
v. Yelp!, Inc., where a dentist brought a defamation suit against the
website for removing positive reviews and refusing to remove
suspicious negative reviews from his listing unless the dentist
purchased advertising space on the website.171 The court categorized
Yelp as an "interactive computer service," defined in the statute as
"any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server."172 This category is different than an "information content
provider," which the statute defines as "any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive
computer service."173  Only the former, the "interactive computer
service," is immune from liability under the FCDA for publishing false
or defamatory reviews provided by third parties.174 By categorizing
Yelp as an interactive computer service, the court granted Yelp-and
thereby similar websites-immunity from suit for defamation
contained in negative reviews.17 5 The court also rejected the plaintiffs
claim that Yelp's manipulation of the reviews to boost advertising
168. Id.
169. See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
170. Id. § 230(c)(1).
171. Reit v. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 412-13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
172. 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(2); Reit, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 413-14.
173. 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(3); Reit, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
174. Reit, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
175. See id. at 413-14.
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sales was a deceptive practice because Yelp directed its conduct at
business owners and was therefore unlikely to deceive consumers. 176
There is thus a distinction between what content the website
produces itself and what content reviewers post. The Fourth Circuit
found:
By its plain language, § 230 [of the FCDA] creates a federal immunity to any cause of
action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a
third-party user of the service. Specifically, § 230 precludes courts from entertaining
claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher's role. Thus,
lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's
traditional editorial functions-such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone
or alter content-are barred. 177
The court went on to tie immunity back to First Amendment rights:
"Congress recognized the threat that tort-based lawsuits pose to
freedom of speech in the new and burgeoning Internet medium," while
at the same time wanting "to keep government interference in the
medium to a minimum."178 Therefore, instead of allowing regulation,
Congress granted outright immunity to the websites.
The court's rationale for this immunity is visible in other areas
apart from the FCDA. For example, in the recent case of Janus
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, the Supreme Court
discussed what it means to "make a statement" in the context of
securities laws.17 9 The Court found that, "One who prepares or
publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its maker."1 80 The
Court further noted, "NMerely hosting a document on a Web site does
not indicate that the hosting entity adopts the document as its own
statement or exercises control over its content."18 1 Similarly, the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act provides immunity for websites
hosting third-party content that allegedly infringes a copyright.182 So
long as the website removes the content upon receiving notice from
the copyright holder, it cannot be held liable.183 Thus, it appears that
both the Court and Congress desire to limit the liability of hosting
176. Id. at 415.
177. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Rodney A.
Smolla, Online Defamation and § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, in 3 SMOLLA &
NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 23:12 (2012).
178. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330.
179. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011)
(describing what it means to '"make' a statement" with regard to false statements in marketing
investment opportunities).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2305 n.12.
182. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1) (2006).
183. Id.
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websites because those sites are simply the platform for a third party
who actually crafts the content.
4. Lanham Act
Business owners who are the target of an opinion spam
campaign might mistakenly bring a trademark claim under the
Lanham Act for false advertising and for creating consumer
confusion.18 4 Trademark law is primarily concerned with "passing off'
and "reverse passing off," where a company confuses consumers into
believing that the goods of one company are actually the goods of
another through the misappropriation of an identifying mark like a
logo, slogan, or packaging.185 The elements of a false advertisement
claim are:
(1) the advertisements of the opposing party are false or misleading as to the party's
own product o[r] another's; (2) the advertisements actually deceived customers or had
the tendency to deceive a substantial portion of the targeted audience; (3) the deception
is material, meaning it is likely to influence purchasing decisions; (4) the defendant's
advertised products traveled in interstate commerce; and (5) the plaintiff has been or is
likely to be injured as a result of the false or misleading advertisements by casually [sic]
related declining sales or loss of goodwill.
1 8 6
Therefore, a victim of online spam may be tempted to bring a
claim under the Lanham Act, as it is primarily concerned with
consumer deception. The victim usually cannot, however, because the
cause of action for false advertising under the Lanham Act must be
related to the business owner's trademark.
Typically, trademarks are not at issue in an opinion spam case
because the marks are often used to correctly identify the business.18 7
Oftentimes, with negative opinion spam the harmful competitor wants
to ensure an innocent company is appropriately distinct in consumers'
minds so that consumers pick the right company-that is, the
competitor-when choosing where to spend their money.188 Therefore,
the competitor correctly uses the innocent company's trademarks. It
would disserve the competitor to misuse the innocent company's
trademark on the chance that consumers would commingle the two
companies in their minds and give their business to the innocent
company instead. With positive opinion spam, a company's reviews
184. Federal Trademark Act (Lanham Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
185. See id.
186. Third Party Verification, Inc. v. Signaturelink, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1314, 1324
(M.D. Fla. 2007).
187. See GoSMiLE, Inc. v. Levine, 769 F. Supp. 2d 630, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (allowing
evidence of online consumer reviews in a trademark infringement case for purposes of
establishing likelihood of consumer confusion).
188. See supra Part I.B.
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praise only themselves, so there is no reason to introduce any mention
of a competitor or its marks, again to avoid the risk of consumer
confusion.189 Thus, unless their trademarks have legitimately been
misappropriated, the Lanham Act is unlikely to provide relief to
innocent companies in opinion-spam cases.
II. OPINION SPAM'S LEAP THROUGH THE LEGAL LOOPHOLES
This Part evaluates each of the legal loopholes discussed in
Part I.D to show why the current laws are inadequate for addressing
opinion spam. In addition, this Part examines various market-based
approaches to dealing with opinion spam.
A. First Amendment of the US Constitution
As a general matter, genuine customers who post their honest
opinions about a company's product or service are entitled to the First
Amendment's freedom of speech protection and cannot be held liable
for defamation, even if their information turns out to be false.190 This
would also likely hold true for people who write reviews in response to
a company's obvious solicitation, for example, in return for a free
sample or a discount, because the reviewers would still be writing
honestly about their experience.191 Honest reviewers, therefore, do not
fit within the definition of opinion spam because most opinion
spammers have never tried the product and therefore do not have a
factual basis for their reviews.192
Should a harmed business owner discover that the information
provided in a review is false and does not reflect the reviewer's honest
belief, she may pursue a defamation claim as a libel action.193 A libel
claim typically consists of proving: (1) false and malicious defamation,
(2) publication in print, and (3) harm to the target's reputation.194 The
latter two requirements are relatively easy to satisfy. A plaintiff may
be able to show harm to the company's reputation from a negative
review,'95 perhaps in terms of lost profits, as Queenstown Rees Hotel
did. 96 Additionally, the posting of the review on a public website
189. See supra Part I.B.
190. See Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d
848, 852 (10th Cir. 1999).
191. See Streitfeld, supra note 13.
192. See discussion supra Parts I.B, I.C.2.
193. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1, 175 F.3d at 852.
194. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-5-1 (2012).
195. See Doe I v. Individuals, 561 F. Supp. 2d 249, 256-57 (D. Conn. 2008).
196. See discussion supra Part I.C.2.
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should satisfy the publication requirement since that is an effective
means of communicating with third parties.197 The first requirement,
however, is more difficult to fulfill, as a plaintiff will likely find it hard
to show a review is both false and malicious given the opaque nature
of opinion spam, especially if the writer posted anonymously and there
is no obvious connection between the writer and a rival company.198
Success on the claim will also depend on the actual content of the
review. If it is quite vague overall, consisting only of general negative
comments, then the plaintiff will not be able to show that it is
"provably false."199
Only after the plaintiff satisfies all elements of the prima facie
libel claim will the courts demand that the ISP turn over any
identifying information it has about the author.200 Thus, if a plaintiff
decides to sue the author of a review, the First Amendment's free
speech protections may hinder her actions at multiple points along the
way.
B. Federal Trade Commission Act
Under the general auspices of the FTCA, the FTC could use its
power to bring claims against a competing company for disparaging
comments made against an innocent company in the online-review
context. Of course, this action assumes the innocent company knows
which competitor paid for the comments, that this competitor knows
the review is false, and the innocent company complains to the FTC.
The FTC, however, must have sufficient evidence that someone in
management authorized payment for the reviews.201 Otherwise, the
court may decide the opinion spam was the unauthorized action of
individual employees, rather than the company's "method" of
competition, and not hold the company liable.202
As stated in Part II.A, the First Amendment protects reviewers
for the substance of their reviews if they honestly believe the veracity
of what they write. The reviewer enjoys such protection regardless of
whether the information is in fact true, thereby prohibiting the FTC
197. See Rataj, supra note 126, at 199-200.
198. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 239 (Ct. App. 2008); see also discussion
supra Parts I.B, I.C.2.
199. Jefferson Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. R-1 v. Moody's Investor's Servs., Inc., 175 F.3d 848,
855 (10th Cir. 1999).
200. See Doe 1, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 256; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 245-46.
201. See Philip Carey Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 29 F.2d 49, 51 (6th Cir. 1928).
202. Id. For example, the company Belkin blamed the solicitation of paid reviewers on
one of its employees, disclaiming any knowledge or approval of the employee's actions. See
Meyer, supra note 11.
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from taking action against such reviewers.203 However, the FTC's
regulatory guidelines permit it to pursue even honest reviewers if they
fail to disclose a material relationship with the hiring company. These
guidelines mark a distinct change since Northam Warren, which held
that no disclosure was necessary because customers would assume a
company paid for its testimonials, perhaps recognizing the fact that
most customers do not actually realize the material financial
connections between companies and reviewers.204
The FTC could also initiate actions against companies that hire
writers to post positive reviews of their own products or services. The
FTC may issue an administrative complaint "when it has 'reason to
believe' that the law has been or is being violated, and it appears to
the Commission that a proceeding is in the public interest."205 The
provision requiring endorsements to "reflect the honest opinions,
findings, beliefs, or experience of the endorser" would seem to create
an avenue for the FTC to bring suit against reviewers if they are not
honest in their reviews.2 06 Additionally, as with the honest reviewers,
the FTC could require the companies hiring the writers to disclose any
material relationships.2 0 7  A court would likely uphold this
requirement given the similarity between opinion spam and Example
Eight of the guidelines. As mentioned in Part I.D.2, this example
addresses individuals, compensated for their endorsements, who write
positive reviews for a product on a message board, which other
consumers assume contains independent opinions.208 The guidelines
state that, in this situation, "the poster should clearly and
conspicuously disclose her relationship to the manufacturer to
members and readers of the message board."209  This disclosure
requirement would address one of the main problems with opinion
spam: consumers are unaware of the financial connection between the
reviewers and the companies they review.210 Therefore, the FTC's
regulations and guidelines already authorize the FTC to take action
and require companies and posters to disclose their financial
relationship in situations analogous to opinion spam.
Based on the Reverb and Legacy Learning cases, it may appear
that the FTC can use its authority to sufficiently police opinion spain
203. See Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640, 644 (3d Cir. 1941); Northam Warren
Corp. v. FTC, 59 F.2d 196, 196-97 (2d Cir. 1932).
204. Northam Warren Corp., 59 F.2d at 197.
205. See Firm to Pay FTC $250,000 to Settle Charges, supra note 141.
206. 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a) (2012).
207. Id. § 255.1(d).
208. Id. § 255.5; see supra Part I.D.2.
209. 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(d).
210. See discussion supra Parts I.B, I.C.1.
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by bringing a suit when necessary.211 As Christine Frietchen, the
Editor-in-Chief of ConsumerSearch.com, noted, however, "Deceptive
review sites are among the first things consumers searching for
reviews on products . . . find, but they come and go so fast, it's difficult
for regulators to police them."2 12 Mary Engle, the Director of the
FTC's Division of Advertising Practices, likewise observed, "The more
egregious the claims are, the more likely they are to be targeted."213
And with only two complaints brought thus far, the FTC has been able
to go after only the most obvious and egregious cases-the lowest
hanging fruit-while still struggling with problems of detection and
widespread abuse. Further, violation of a settlement agreement made
with the FTC carries a civil penalty of up to only $16,000, which may
not be sufficient to inspire companies to actually adhere to settlement
provisions, lax as the settlement provisions might be.2 14 Therefore,
while relying on the FTC may seem like a viable option, it is not
enough on its own to adequately address the growing problem of
opinion spam.
C. Federal Communications Decency Act
The FCDA prevents harmed business owners from bringing
claims against hosting websites by insulating them from liability. For
example, the plaintiff in Reit faced this barrier of immunity and was
unable to pursue claims against either Yelp or the anonymous authors
of the negative reviews.215 Moreover, maintaining the distinction
between the website and anonymous authors creates another level of
protection for the company that hired the reviewer. If the FCDA had
instead collapsed the categories and maintained liability for both the
websites and the authors, the websites would have an incentive to
help discover the identities of both the hiring company and the
writers, in order to shift their own liability onto them.
While both Congress and the courtS2 16 appear to believe that
the host websites are a hands-off platform where third parties post
information, providing immunity ignores the active role that websites
can play in perpetuating opinion spam. With complete immunity in
the realm of opinion spam, hosting websites are unaccountable to
reviewed businesses and consumers and are able to manipulate
211. See O'Donnell, supra note 25.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. See Firm to Pay FTC $250,000 to Settle Charges, supra note 141.
215. Reit v. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 413 (Sup. Ct. 2010).




reviews for their own profit by requiring business owners to purchase
advertising space if they want the websites to remove negative
reviews.217  These websites are not taking the passive role that
Congress and the courts apparently imagined; some are instead
actively exacerbating the problem for their own gain.
Congress should take guidance from the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA) and allow for a notice-and-takedown procedure
similar to that used in allegations of copyright infringement.218 The
DMCA limits websites' potential liability for hosting material that
infringes another's copyright if "upon notification of claimed
infringement. . . [it] responds expeditiously to remove, or disable
access to, the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the
subject of infringing activity."2 19  Under this statute, an entity,
believing that posted material violates its copyright, may notify the
hosting website and demand it take down the infringing material.
This notice-and-takedown procedure appropriately recognizes that
websites can and should remove offending content.220
D. Private Market-Based Approaches
As discussed in Part I.C.2, one approach to avoid negative
reviews generally is to encourage customers to contact the company if
they have a complaint before posting a harmful review online.221
While this might work for real reviews, for negative opinion spam,
which the authors completely fabricate for payment by a competitor,
such efforts would be fruitless. Another approach is to hire a
public-relations firm, like Main Street Hub or KwickChex, to help
manage an affected company's online reputation.222 It is unclear
whether these reputation-management firms are effective, and there
is also the risk that they will fail to disclose a material relationship
with any real customers whom they incentivize to write positive
reviews. In addition, this approach financially burdens the client and
is especially onerous for small companies with limited resources.
A group of retail-electronics companies that host reviews took a
more top-level approach in their recent "Manifesto."223 Recognizing
the harm to their own reputations if someone discovers fake reviews
217. See Reit, 907 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
218. See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006)).
219. 17 U.S.C. § 512(d)(3).
220. See id. § 512(c)(1)(C).
221. See Elliott, supra note 93; supra Part I.C.2.
222. See Streitfeld, supra note 13; Sweney, supra note 99; supra Part I.C.2.
223. See Baker, supra note 100.
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on their websites, they have agreed to try to eliminate opinion
spam.2 2 4 Prompted by social-commerce company Reevoo, the group
has created its own logo to reassure customers that the reviews on
their websites are trustworthy.225  Reevoo claims that all of the
reviews must come from people who have actually purchased the
product,226 which is consistent with findings by Cornell researcher Jeff
Hancock indicating that websites that limit posting ability to people
who have actually purchased the product have fewer deceptive
reviews.227 This effort could be expanded by including provisions in
the websites' terms of service that would enable the host to screen for
and remove fake reviews. These terms could also prohibit use of the
website to post fake reviews.228 Websites that already contain such
provisions in their terms of service should enforce them to maintain
their own reputational standards. This joint endeavor would help cut
off fake reviews at the front end by blocking the spammers' ability to
post opinion spam.
III. TRIPARTITE SOLUTION
In order to adequately address the problem of opinion spam, a
multi-tiered approach is necessary. This Note advocates for a
three-part solution. First, the FTC should step up efforts to bring
complaints and penalties against those companies for which it can find
clear evidence of review solicitation. Second, Congress should amend
the FCDA to eliminate immunity for the hosting websites so that
prospective plaintiffs can hold them accountable for maintaining false
postings online. Third, the hosting websites should proactively bar
and help identify spammers by utilizing some of the market-based
approaches discussed in Part II.D.
A. Increase FTC Enforcement
The FTC currently has the power to bring complaints against
those accused of paying for opinion spam; however, so far it has gone
after only the most egregious abuses and with minimal penalties. As




227. O'Donnell, supra note 25.
228. See, e.g., TripAdvisor Website Terms, Conditions and Notices, supra note 105
(prohibiting users from posting content "that impersonates any person or entity or otherwise
misrepresents your affiliation with a person or entity" in addition to reserving the right to
remove any content for any reason).
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authority under the FTCA to bring charges against sponsoring
companies for deceptive trade practices.229 However, in the Reverb
case, the FTC settled in return for a mere promise to remove the
deceptive reviews and refrain from posting any more without a proper
disclosure.230 No monetary damages were assessed.231 In the Legacy
Learning case, the FTC settlement included a similar promise and
payment of 5 percent of the sales allegedly resulting from the
endorsements.232 These minimal penalties hardly seem likely to deter
future abuses by either these same companies or others engaged in
similar practices.
Instead, the FTC should increase its efforts to investigate
submitted complaints and to identify opinion spam authors and the
companies sponsoring them.2 33 It should at least require disclosure of
monetary associations, even for honest reviewers who receive an
incentive to provide a positive yet truthful review. If the FTC does
settle with a company, it should require more than a simple promise
not to break the rules.2 3 4  It should also impose stiff monetary
damages to send a message that it will not tolerate these types of
business practices, and it should utilize its ability to impose additional
civil penalties for any violation of a settlement agreement.235 Perhaps
then deterrence will be more effective.
B. Eliminate Immunity for Websites under the FCDA
As a second step, Congress should amend the FCDA to
eliminate immunity for websites that knowingly host fake reviews. 23 6
The courts and Congress justify this immunity with a misguided belief
that these websites are just platforms for third-party users, and those
users alone should be liable for the content of the posts.2 3 7 These
websites have full control over removing any reviews they want taken
down. Additionally, at least some hosts are taking advantage of their
immunity by forcing the targeted business owners to pay for
advertising on the website if they want the negative reviews
229. See O'Donnell, supra note 25.
230. See Public Relations Firm to Settle FTC Charges, supra note 119.
231. Id.
232. See Firm to Pay FTC $250,000 to Settle Charges, supra note 141.
233. See FTC Complaint Assistant, FTC, https://www.ftecomplaintassistant.gov/FTC-
Wizard.aspx Oast visited Sept. 15, 2012) (enabling visitors to the FTC website to submit a
complaint online).
234. See discussion supra Part I.D.2.
235. See Firm to Pay FTC $250,000 to Settle Charges, supra note 141.
236. See generally 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2006).
237. See discussion supra Part I.D.3.
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removed.238 Far from being inactive participants, Congress needs to
hold these websites accountable.
Moreover, the justification based on protecting free-speech
rights is counterintuitive. Congress is indicating that the websites are
inactive-and thus not exercising their free-speech rights-yet
Congress still grants them immunity to help protect their supposed
speech. Meanwhile, Congress has denied immunity for the authors of
the posts, who are the ones most obviously speaking, but who still face
liability since the First Amendment does not protect defamatory
statements.239
Reinstating liability would open the door to private litigation
and FTC enforcement and appropriately recognize the websites'
substantial role in managing their own content. By exposing host
websites to liability, Congress would incentivize the websites to help
identify authors-who may otherwise remain anonymous-in order to
shift the websites' liability onto the source of the reviews.240 At the
very least, this amendment would encourage websites to take a more
proactive role in implementing measures to inhibit authors' ability to
post fake reviews.
C. Encourage Websites to Restrict Authors'Ability to Post
While some websites have voluntarily tried to combat opinion
spam to protect their own reputations, others have done little or
nothing to abate the problem. By reinstating liability under an
amended FCDA, Congress would properly encourage all websites to
inhibit authors' ability to post opinion spam to limit their own
liability. The websites should add provisions to their terms of service
that prohibit users from posting fake reviews. They should then use
their power to identify and remove suspicious posts (perhaps by using
computer algorithms), deactivate accounts of abusive posters, and file
complaints with the FTC for the FTC to investigate.
For those websites that sell products online, the websites
should limit the ability to post reviews to only those people who have
actually purchased the product through their website, rather than
ones that claim to own the product but to have purchased it elsewhere.
Box stores could create a system to link a customer's in-store
purchases to that person's online account so they could still write
reviews of the products. For those websites that deal with reviews of
local services, the websites should also require authors to disclose
238. See, e.g., Reit v. Yelp!, Inc., 907 N.Y.S.2d 411, 413-14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
239. See discussion supra Parts I.D.1, II.A.
240. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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more identifying information before signing up and posting reviews.
While some websites currently require only a name, email address,
and zip code,241 additional information could include a verifiable phone
number and mailing address. Reviewers could still post anonymously,
in accordance with their First Amendment protections, so normal
website viewers would not know who they are, but the website could
disclose the information to plaintiffs or to the FTC to help identify
parties. The website could then remove reviews from accounts that
are no longer active or that no longer have valid identification
information. The websites would have some meaningful information
to identify the user, should a court require disclosure.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has explored the pervasive and growing problem of
opinion spam in online consumer reviews. These fake reviews cause
problems not only for unsuspecting consumers, but also for competing
businesses. Those reviewers who honestly believe what they write
enjoy First Amendment protection. Even those who write falsely
enjoy a limited right to anonymity unless a plaintiff can prove the
prima facie elements of her defamation case. If the identities of the
authors or sponsoring company are discoverable, however, then
potential plaintiffs and the FTC may pursue action. The FTC should
augment not only its efforts at filing complaints against known
offenders, but also the penalties it demands in settlement or court
proceedings. However, under the FCDA, the hosting websites
currently enjoy immunity. Congress should amend the FCDA by
eliminating website immunity to hold those accountable who might
take advantage of the immunity for their own gain. Those websites
that voluntarily undertake measures to weed out fake reviews to
protect their own reputations and avoid liability should restrict
reviews to those who have actually purchased the product, or should
at least obtain more identifying information from the posters to assist
in identifying them. Through these combined efforts, consumers
wouldbecome more aware of opinion spam, and those who could curb it
will have the proper power and incentives to do so.
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